David Holloway, Barbarossa and the Bomb: Two Cases of Soviet Intelligence in World War II, in Jonathan Haslam and Karina Urbach, eds.,Secret Intelligence in the European States System, 1918-1989(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2014), 63-64. It would force the Japanese to surrender, shorten the war, save lives and money, and avoid us from asking the Soviet Union to get involved. How much did top officials know about the radiation effects of the weapons? The target would be a city--either Hiroshima, Kyoto (still on the list), or Niigata--but specific aiming points would not be specified at that time nor would industrial pin point targets because they were likely to be on the fringes a city. Brown Papers, box 68, folder 13, Transcript/Draft B, Returning from the Potsdam Conference, sailing on the U.S.S. 35+ YEARS OF FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACTION, FOIA Advisory Committee Oversight Reports, a helpful collection of archival documents, on-line resources on the first atomic test. [46]. Moscows opening to Japan in 2015 then engendered a shift in Japan-Russia relations, as confirmed by Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrovs visit to Tokyo in April, Prime Minister Shinzo Abes bold visit to Moscow in May and Naryshkins visit to Tokyo in June 2016, right after President Obamas historical visit to Hiroshima at the end of May. (Photo from U.S. National Archives, RG 77-AEC), The polar cap of the "Fat Man" weapon being sprayed with plastic spray paint in front of Assembly Building Number 2. Independence, MO 64050 Frank, 286-287; Sherwin, 233-237; Bernstein (1995), 150; Maddox, 148. Riabev, ed., Atomnyi Proekt SSSR (Moscow: izd MFTI, 2002), Volume 1, Part 2, 335-336. That possibility would be difficult if the United States made first military use of the weapon. When the atomic bomb was dropped, I felt: "This is terrible." Immediately thereafter, it was reported Soviet Russia entered the war. That there may be a difference between the two sources becomes evident from some of the entries; for example, in the entry for July 18, 1945 Brown wrote: "Although I knew about the atomic bomb when I wrote these notes, I dared not place it in writing in my book., The degree to which the typed-up version reflects the original is worth investigating. When Truman received a detailed account of the test, Stimson reported that the President was tremendously pepped up by it and that it gave him an entirely new feeling of confidence (see entry for July 21). Frank, 273-274; Bernstein, The Alarming Japanese Buildup on Southern Kyushu, Growing U.S. Lower image - August 11, 1945, photo by 6th Photo Reconnaissance Group After a White House meeting on 14 August, British Minister John Balfour reported that Truman had remarked sadly that he now had no alternative but to order an atomic bomb to be dropped on Tokyo. This was likely emotional thinking spurred by anxiety and uncertainty. . [76]. In later years, those who knew both thought it unlikely that the general would have expressed misgivings about using the bomb to a civilian superior. An intercepted message from Togo to Sato showed that Tokyo remained interested in securing Moscows good office but that it is difficult to decide on concrete peace conditions here at home all at once. [W]e are exerting ourselves to collect the views of all quarters on the matter of concrete terms. Barton Bernstein, Richard Frank, and Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, among others, have argued that the Magic intercepts from the end of July and early August show that the Japanese were far from ready to surrender. The Supreme War Council comprised the prime minister, foreign minister, army and navy ministers, and army and navy chiefs of staff; see Hasegawa, 72. Bernstein, however, notes that Bard later denied that he had a meeting with Truman and that White House appointment logs support that claim. The British National Archives, Records of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, FO 800/461. [27]. [42]. Eisenhower and McCloys Views on the Bombings and Atomic Weapons, National Security Archive With the material that follows, the National Security Archive publishes the most comprehensive on-line collection to date of declassified U.S. government documents on the atomic bomb and the end of the war in the Pacific. Tens of thousands were killed in the initial explosions and many more would later succumb to radiation poisoning. Furthermore, the United States demanded that the Japanese withdraw from conquered areas of China and Indochina. It was Meiklejohns birthday and during the dinner party, Eisenhower and McCloy had an interesting discussion of atomic weapons, which included comments alluding to scientists statements about what appears to be the H-bomb project (a 20 megaton weapon), recollection of the early fear that an atomic detonation could burn up the atmosphere, and the Navys reluctance to use its battleships to test atomic weapons. A collectionoftranscribed documents is Gene Dannens Atomic Bomb: Decision. For a print collection of documents, see Dennis Merrill ed.,Documentary History of the Truman Presidency: Volume I: The Decision to Drop the Atomic Bomb on Japan(University Publications of America, 1995). Bix appears to have moved toward a position close to Hasegawas; see Bix, Japan's Surrender Decision and the Monarchy: Staying the Course in an Unwinnable War,Japan Focus. [44]. On August 6, 1945, an atomic bomb was dropped on the people of Hiroshima. To keep the secret, Bush wanted to avoid a ruinous appropriations request to Congress and asked Roosevelt to ask Congress for the necessary discretionary funds. Upper image - July 24, 1945, photo by 28th Photo Reconnaissance Squadron Two scientists at Oak Ridges Health Division, Henshaw and Coveyou, saw a United Press report in the Knoxville News Sentinel about radiation sickness caused by the bombings. Possibly not wanting to take responsibility for the first use of nuclear weapons, Army Air Force commanders sought formal authorization from Chief of Staff Marshall who was then in Potsdam, RG 77, MED Records, Top Secret Documents, Files no. That figure was based on underestimates by Manhattan Project scientists: the actual yield of the test device was 20 kilotons. The Magic intercepts from mid-July have figured in Gar Alperovitzs argument that Truman and his advisers recognized that the Emperor was ready to capitulate if the Allies showed more flexibility on the demand for unconditional surrender. The United States, along with other countries, criticized Japanese aggression but shied away from any economic or military punishments. [55] On 22 July Marshall asked Deputy Chief of Staff Thomas Handy to prepare a draft; General Groves wrote one which went to Potsdam for Marshalls approval. General Douglas MacArthur had been slated as commander for military operations against Japans mainland, this letter to Truman from Forrestal shows that the latter believed that the matter was not settled. On the 70th anniversary of the bombing of Hiroshima on August 6, 1945, the National Security Archive updates its 2005 publication of the most comprehensive on-line collection of declassified U.S. government documents on the first use of the atomic bomb and the end of the war in the Pacific. He believed it essential that the United States declare its intention to preserve the institution of the emperor. While Lincoln believed that the proposed peace teams were militarily acceptable he doubted that they were workable or that they could check Soviet expansion which he saw as an inescapable result of World War II. In his 1948 memoirs (further amplified in his 1963 memoirs), Eisenhower claimed that he had expressed the hope [to Stimson] that we would never have to use such a thing against an enemy because I disliked seeing the United States take the lead in introducing into war something as horrible and destructive as this new weapon was described to be. That language may reflect the underlying thinking behind Eisenhowers statement during the dinner party, but whether Eisenhower used such language when speaking with Stimson has been a matter of controversy. The outspoken Szilard was not involved in operational work on the bomb and General Groves kept him under surveillance but Met Lab director Arthur Compton found Szilard useful to have around. After President Roosevelt died on April 12th, 1945, it became Harry Trumans job to decide how to end the war. After the first successful test of the atomic bomb in 1945, U.S. officials immediately considered the potential non-military benefits that could be derived from the American nuclear monopoly. It had nothing to do with Russia or Britain or Germany. Within a few days Japan surrendered, and the terrible struggle that we call World War II was over. Additional bombs will be delivery on the [targets] as soon as made ready by the project staff., RG 77, MED Records, Top Secret Documents, File no. The documents may even provoke new questions. coinspot deposit not showing. Social critic Dwight MacDonald published trenchant criticisms immediately after Hiroshima-Nagasaki; seePolitics Past: Essays in Political Criticism(New York: Viking, 1972), 169-180. Barton J. Bernstein, "'Reconsidering the 'Atomic General': Leslie R. Groves,"The Journal of Military History67 (July 2003): 883-920. At 10:50 a.m., he met with the leadership at the bomb shelter in his palace. The United States used the bomb to end the war with Japan, which began in 1941 when Japan launched an unprovoked attack on Pearl Harbor. In 1945, atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. [80]. Soviet officials also rushed to visit Hiroshima and Nagasaki to survey damage to the cities and assess the power of the atomic bomb. Private collections were also important, such as the Henry L. Stimson Papers held at Yale University (although available on microfilm, for example, at the Library of Congress) and the papers of W. Averell Harriman at the Library of Congress. The History and Public Policy Programmakes public the primary source record of 20th and 21st century international history from repositories around the world, facilitates scholarship based on those records, and uses these materials to provide context for classroom, public, and policy debates on global affairs. However, the Department of the Interior opposed the disclosure of the nature of the weapon. If you were President Truman in 1945, would you have dropped the bomb? The U.S. documents cited here will be familiar to many knowledgeable readers on the Hiroshima-Nagasaki controversy and the history of the Manhattan Project. How familiar was President Truman with the concepts that led target planners chose major cities as targets? [77], Harry S. Truman Library, President's Secretary's Files, Speech Files, 1945-1953, copy on U.S. National Archives Web Site, On 15 December, President Truman spoke about the atomic bombings in his speech at the annual dinner of the Gridiron Club, organized by bureau chiefs and other leading figures of print media organizations. The events leading up to the dropping of the first atomic bomb can be traced back to 7 th December 1941, when the Japanese attacked the US Pacific fleet at Pearl Harbour. When the Foreign Minister met with the Emperor, Hirohito agreed with him; he declared that the top priority was an early end to the war, although it would be acceptable to seek better surrender terms--probably U.S. acceptance of a figure-head emperor--if it did not interfere with that goal. In light of those instructions, Togo and Prime Minister Suzuki agreed that the Supreme War Council should meet the next day. For reviews of the controversy, see Barton J. Bernstein, The Struggle Over History: Defining the Hiroshima Narrative, ibid., 128-256, and Charles T. OReilly and William A. Rooney,The Enola Gay and The Smithsonian(Jefferson, NC: McFarland and Company, 2005). [37], RG 165, Army Operations OPD Executive File #17, Item 13 (copy courtesy of J. Samuel Walker), The day after the Togo message was reported, Army intelligence chief Weckerling proposed several possible explanations of the Japanese diplomatic initiative. Augusta, Truman learned about the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and announced it twice, first to those in the wardroom (socializing/dining area for commissioned officers), and then to the sailors mess. 25,000 more were injured. atomic bomb dropped to intimidate russia. (Photo from U.S. National Archives, RG 77-AEC), An overview of the destruction of Hiroshima [undated, circa August-September 1945]. A few weeks later, on September 2, 1945 Japanese representatives signed surrender documents on the USS Missouri, in Tokyo harbor.[71]. Was the bombing of Nagasaki unnecessary? Thus, the extent to which the bombings contributed to the end of World War II or the beginning of the Cold War remain live issues. This photo was taken from the Red Cross Hospital Building about one mile from the bomb burst. 816-268-8200 | 800-833-1225 Maddox, 102; Alperovitz, 269-270; Hasegawa, 152-153. The Soviets had notified Japan's Ambassador to Moscow on the night of the eighth that the Soviet Union would be at war with Japan as of August 9th (Butow, pg. These cables are the earliest reports of the mission; the bombing of Nagasaki killed immediately at least 39,000 people, with more dying later. Henry L. Stimson Papers (MS 465), Sterling Library, Yale University (reel 113) (microfilm at Library of Congress), Still interested in trying to find ways to warn Japan into surrender, this represents an attempt by Stimson before the Potsdam conference, to persuade Truman and Byrnes to agree to issue warnings to Japan prior to the use of the bomb. [73] As it turned out, a few hours later, at 4:05 p.m., the White House received the Japanese surrender announcement. There were battles and military posts in surprising places. [62]. The non-specialist staff sent to observe these effects, their biased premise, and the markings on the documents all suggest that the report was from the beginning meant to anticipate and align with Stalins intention to downplay the importance of the United States atomic bomb while pushing the Soviet Unions own nuclear project forward. As Farrell observed in his discussion of Hiroshima, Summaries of Japanese reports previously sent are essentially correct, as to clinical effects from single gamma radiation dose. Such findings dismayed Groves, who worried that the bomb would fall into a taboo category like chemical weapons, with all the fear and horror surrounding them. We gave them fair warning and asked them to quit. Claypool, 1984) With such motivation to back them, the United States felt justified in dropping the atomic bomb in order to prevent the spread of communism in Europe by intimidating Russia. Sayuri Romei examines Soviet records produced in the aftermath of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the continuing importance of Hiroshima to Russian foreign policy. Some may associate this statement with one that Eisenhower later recalled making to Stimson. A flash, stronger than the sun itself, followed by a fiery explosion within seconds completely annihilated the city. [34], On the eve of the Potsdam conference, Leo Szilard circulated a petition as part of a final effort to discourage military use of the bomb. [35]. [2]. The Caribbean and Central America, Greenland, Alaska, and the Aleutian Islands, Iraq, Syria, Burma, and the Arctic are a few of the little known places that were involved. Before summarizing the findings of the embassy mission, Malik offered the premise that the report was limited to a recording of conversations and personal impressions without any kind of generalizations or conclusions. However, it is clear from the beginning that this report had the objective of minimizing the effects of the atomic bomb. Library of Congress . [53], RG 457, Summaries of Intercepted Japanese Messages (Magic Far East Summary, March 20, 1942 October 2, 1945), box 7, SRS 491-547, This Far East Summary included reports on the Japanese Armys plans to disperse fuel stocks to reduce vulnerability to bombing attacks, the text of a directive by the commander of naval forces on Operation Homeland, the preparations and planning to repel a U.S. invasion of Honshu, and the specific identification of army divisions located in, or moving into, Kyushu. The total destruction of that city, and the instant incineration of 40,000 mostly civilian people, occurred just three days after the destruction of Hiroshima by a 15-kiloton uranium bomb, which instantly killed 70,000. [9], RG 77, Correspondence ("Top Secret") of the Manhattan Engineer District, 1942-1946, file 25M. RG 77, Harrison-Bundy Files (H-B Files), folder 69 (copy from microfilm), While Groves worried about the engineering and production problems, key War Department advisers were becoming troubled over the diplomatic and political implications of these enormously powerful weapons and the dangers of a global nuclear arms race. Were there alternatives to the use of the weapons? With direct access to the documents, readers may develop their own answers to the questions raised above. Collectively the decoded messages were known as Magic. How this came about is explained in an internal history of pre-war and World War II Army and Navy code-breaking activities prepared by William F. Friedman, a central figure in the development of U.S. government cryptology during the 20th century. Richard Frank sees this as evidence of the uncertainty felt by senior officials about the situation in early August; Forrestal would not have been so audacious to take an action that could ignite a political firestorm if he seriously thought the end of the war was near., Library of Congress Manuscript Division, Papers of W. Averell Harriman, box 181, Chron File Aug 5-9, 1945, Shortly after the Soviets declared war on Japan, in line with commitments made at the Yalta and Potsdam conferences, Ambassador Harriman met with Stalin, with George Kennan keeping the U.S. record of the meeting. Reasons Why the U.S. Conflict in the Pacific began well before the official start of World War II. Was the dropping of the atomic bombs morally justifiable. More intercepted messages on the bombing of Hiroshima. [2] During the 1960s the availability of primary sources made historical research and writing possible and the debate became more vigorous. As Hull explained, should we not concentrate on targets that will be of greatest assistance to an invasion rather than industry, morale, psychology, etc. Nearer the tactical use, Seaman agreed and they discussed the tactics that could be used for beach landings. [30]. 25,000 more were injured. To what extent were senior officials interested in looking at alternatives to urban targets? [16]. The question is: The Untied States decision to drop the atomic bomb on Hiroshima was a diplomatic measure calculated to intimidate the Soviet Union in the post-Second-World-War era rather then a strictly military measure designed to force Japan's unconditional suuender. Presumably the clarified warning would be issued prior to the use of the bomb; if the Japanese persisted in fighting then the full force of our new weapons should be brought to bear and a heavier warning would be issued backed by the actual entrance of the Russians in the war. Possibly, as Malloy has argued, Stimson was motivated by concerns about using the bomb against civilians and cities, but his latest proposal would meet resistance at Potsdam from Byrnes and other. Why were alternatives not pursued? Before he received Togos message, Sato had already met with Molotov on another matter. By the end of November over ten weapons would be available, presumably in the event the war had continued. Besides Truman, guests included New York Governor Thomas Dewey (Republican presidential candidate in 1944 and 1948), foreign ambassadors, members of the cabinet and the Supreme Court, the military high command, and various senators and representatives. Due to the relations of Russia . According to Merkulov, two fissile materials were being produced: element-49 (plutonium), and U-235; the test device was fueled by plutonium. Schaffer,Wings of Judgment, 143-146. The Secretary of War, Mr. Stimson, and I weighed that decision most prayerfully. Frightened by the rapid movement of Soviet forces into Manchuria and worried that the army might launch a coup, the peace party set in motion a plan to persuade Hirohito to meet with the cabinet and the Big Six to resolve the stalemate over the response to the Allies. The traditional argument was that Stalin was angry because Truman did not tell him about the Atomic Bomb. The United States Government's decision to attack Russia with the atomic bomb ultimate proved to scare the Russians. [61], Documents 73A-B: Ramsey Letter from Tinian Island, Library of Congress, J. Robert Oppenheimer Papers, box 60, Ramsey, Norman. For example, Bernstein cites the entries for 20 and 24 July to argue that American leaders did not view Soviet entry as a substitute for the bomb but that the latter would be so powerful, and the Soviet presence in Manchuria so militarily significant, that there was no need for actual Soviet intervention in the war. For Brown's diary entry of 3 August 9 1945 historians have developed conflicting interpretations (See discussion of document 57). According to a Joint Chiefs of Staff report on Japanese target systems, expected results from the bombing campaign included: The absorption of man-hours in repair and relief; the dislocation of labor by casualty; the interruption of public services necessary to production, and above all the destruction of factories engaged in war industry. While Stimson would later raise questions about the bombing of Japanese cities, he was largely disengaged from the details (as he was with atomic targeting). "Little Boy" weighed about 9,000 pounds and had a yield approximating 15,000 tons of high explosives. For Davies at Potsdam, see Elizabeth Kimball MacLean,Joseph E. Davies: Envoy to the Soviets(Westport, CT: Praeger, 1992), 151-166. Bush-Conant papers, S-1 Historical File, Reports to and Conferences with the President (1942-1944), National Archives, Record Group 77, Records of the Army Corps of Engineers (hereinafter RG 77), Manhattan Engineering District (MED), Minutes of the Military Policy Meeting (5 May 1943), Correspondence (Top Secret) of the Manhattan Engineer District, 1942-1946, microfilm publication M1109 (Washington, D.C.: National Archives and Records Administration, 1980), Roll 3, Target 6, Folder 23, Military Policy Committee, Minutes of Meetings, Before the Manhattan Project had produced any weapons, senior U.S. government officials had Japanese targets in mind. My analysis will provide some historical and political context and offer an initial assessment of these documents. editors,Toward a Livable World: Leo Szilard and the Crusade for Nuclear Arms Control(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1987), xxx-xxv; Sherwin, 210-215. [29]. By Marc Gallicchio. It is part of the Wilson Center's History and Public Policy Program. Peter Grose,Gentleman Spy: The Life of Allen Dulles(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1994), 170-174, 248-249. Read more, The Cold War International History Project supports the full and prompt release of historical materials by governments on all sides of the Cold War. A full translation of the surrender offer was circulated separately. [79]. A directive (right), written by Leslie Groves , approved by President Truman, and issued by Secretary of War Henry Stimson and General of the . Russias annexation of Crimea in February 2014 escalated tensions between Washington and Moscow and changed the global perception of Russias role in international politics. The Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, brought the United States officially into World War II. [11]. By early August he decided that 9-10 August 1945 would be the best dates for striking Japanese forces in Manchuria. Nevertheless, his diary suggests that military hard-liners were very much in charge and that Prime Minister Suzuki was talking tough against surrender, by evoking last ditch moments in Japanese history and warning of the danger that subordinate commanders might not obey surrender orders. At the Wilson Center, it is part of the Wilson Center's History and Public Policy Program. The embassy teams included GRU members Mikhail Ivanov and German Sergeev in August, and TASS correspondent Anatoliy Varshavskiy, former acting military attach Mikhail Romanov, and Naval apparatus employee Sergey Kikenin in September. Although they have been public for 30 years, new translations of these sources are now freely accessible on the Wilson Centers Digital Archive. Toward that end, in 2005, at the time of the 60th anniversary of the bombings, staff at the National Security Archive compiled and scanned a significant number of declassified U.S. government documents to make them more widely available. The Japanese Surrender in World War II. J. Samuel Walker has cited this document to make the point that contrary to revisionist assertions, American policymakers in the summer of 1945 were far from certain that the Soviet invasion of Manchuria would be enough in itself to force a Japanese surrender. [24], In a memorandum to George Harrison, Stimsons special assistant on Manhattan Project matters, Arneson noted actions taken at the recent Interim Committee meetings, including target criterion and an attack without prior warning., Henry Stimson Papers, Sterling Library, Yale University (microfilm at Library of Congress), Stimson and Truman began this meeting by discussing how they should handle a conflict with French President DeGaulle over the movement by French forces into Italian territory. The panel argued for early military use but not before informing key allies about the atomic project to open a dialogue on how we can cooperate in making this development contribute to improved international relations., Record Group 218, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Central Decimal Files, 1942-1945, box 198 334 JCS (2-2-45) Mtg 186th-194th. [38]. The bomb ended the war. The numbered items are military and industrial installations with the percentages of total destruction. Photo restoration by TX Unlimited, San Francisco, A nuclear weapon of the "Little Boy" type, the uranium gun-type detonated over Hiroshima. The discussion of available targets included Hiroshima, the largest untouched target not on the 21st Bomber Command priority list. But other targets were under consideration, including Yawata (northern Kyushu), Yokohama, and Tokyo (even though it was practically rubble.) The problem was that the Air Force had a policy of laying waste to Japans cities which created tension with the objective of reserving some urban targets for nuclear destruction. How is the current debate about immigration in the United States rooted in our nations past? Quotation and statistics from Thomas R. Searle, `It Made a Lot of Sense to Kill Skilled Workers: The Firebombing of Tokyo in March 1945,The Journal of Military History55 (2002):103. Alperovitz, 281-282. Another statementFini Japs when that [Soviet entry] comes abouthas also been the subject of controversy over whether it meant that Truman thought it possible that the war could end without an invasion of Japan.[45]. To produce material for any of those purposes required a capability to separate uranium isotopes in order to produce fissionable U-235. How and when it should be used had been the subject of high-level debate for months. Stalin considered various dates to schedule an attack. Analyzes how the united states and the soviet union became superpowers as world war ii ended. Record Group 457, Records of the National Security Agency/Central Security Service, Magic Diplomatic Summaries 1942-1945, box 18. Tsar Bomba's yield is estimated to have been roughly 57 megatons, about 1,500 times the combined power of the atomic bombs that destroyed Hiroshima and Nagasaki . This. [68], George C. Marshall Library, Lexington, VA, George C. Marshall Papers (copy courtesy of Barton J. Bernstein), While Truman had rescinded the order to drop nuclear bombs, the war was not yet over and uncertainty about Japans next step motivated war planner General John E. Hull (assistant chief of staff for the War Departments Operations Division), and one of Groves associates, Colonel L. E. Seeman, to continue thinking about further nuclear use and its relationship to a possible invasion of Japan. Marshall believed that the latter required Soviet entry and an invasion of Kyushu, even suggesting that Soviet entry might be the decisive action levering them into capitulation. Truman and the Chiefs reviewed plans to land troops on Kyushu on 1 November, which Marshall believed was essential because air power was not decisive.